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The recent dramatic decline in crop prices is a boon for livestock producers but a 
bust for crop producers, particu-
larly for producers who just agreed 
to pay high rents. More generally, 
the tremendous volatility in all 
commodity markets makes it nearly 
impossible for producers and the 
food industry to plan for the future. 
But farmers need to begin planning 
for their 2009 crop, and food pro-
ducers need to make procurement 
plans for the remainder of this mar-
keting year. The type of plan that 
will be profi table depends on the 
answers to a number of key ques-
tions: Have we seen the end of high 
corn prices? Will prices continue to 
decline, and if so, how low will they 
go? Have we seen the end of the 
food versus fuel debate?
Making predictions about com-
modity prices in such a volatile 
market may seem foolhardy. How-
ever, there are key factors that can 
be examined to gain insight into 
where prices may be headed. But 
before we examine these factors, 
it is instructive to review exactly 
how the market price of corn—the 
major feedstock for ethanol—is 
determined. 
Determining the Market 
Price of Corn
Corn is fed to domestic livestock, 
converted into ethanol, fed to live-
stock in export markets, and used 
as a food ingredient. Each user 
within these groups has a maximum 
price he or she can pay for corn. 
This maximum price is the thresh-
old price that if exceeded causes 
the user’s demand for corn to fall 
to zero. That is, the user shuts the 
operation down or switches to an 
alternative to corn. 
The market price of corn is de-
termined by the user with the lowest 
maximum price such that the total 
demand for corn at this price equals 
the total supply of corn. This last 
user is often referred to as the mar-
ginal user of corn. Most domestic 
livestock feeders have a very high 
maximum price they can pay for 
corn because they must keep their 
animals alive and alternative feeds 
are generally priced relative to the 
corn price. Food manufacturers also 
have a high willingness to pay for 
corn because corn represents such 
a small share of their total costs. 
This high willingness to pay for corn 
explains why corn prices can climb 
so dramatically when shortages oc-
cur. Conversely, when corn supplies 
are plentiful, the price of corn can 
drop dramatically because there are 
not many important corn users with 
a low maximum price of corn. 
Prediction of corn prices is dif-
fi cult in any year because we can-
not know for certain which user of 
corn will be the user with the lowest 
maximum price. Looking at the 
2009 crop, we do not know who the 
marginal user will be because we do 
not know what total supply will be. 
However, we may fi nd some clues 
about who the marginal user in 2009 
will be by looking at projected sup-
ply and demand balances for both 
2008 and 2009. 
Non-Ethanol Users of Corn 
The USDA projects that in the 2008 
marketing year, the domestic live-
stock industry will consume about 
5.4 billion bushels of corn, corn 
exports will be about 2 billion bush-
els, and other uses (food, seed, and 
non-fuel industrial) will be about 1.3 
billion bushels. Because the varia-
tion in the maximum willingness to 
pay for corn by the domestic live-
stock industry and by the food and 
seed sectors is not high, we can 
treat their 2009 demands as approx-
imately fi xed at these levels. Poten-
tial importers of U.S. corn in 2009 
have more variation in their maxi-
mum willingness to pay for corn, so 
export numbers will vary somewhat 
with U.S. supplies. 
These three demand sources, 
most of which have a very high 
maximum willingness to pay for 
corn, sum to 8.7 billion bushels. 
This means that if the supply of 
corn in 2009 falls below 8.7 billion 
bushels, then the price of corn will 
skyrocket. In fact, supplies will need 
to be much greater than 8.7 billion 
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bushels to avoid high corn prices be-
cause demand from the ethanol sec-
tor has not yet been accounted for. 
Ability of Ethanol Producers 
to Pay for Corn 
The maximum price of corn for eth-
anol producers is the price above 
which they begin to lose money. 
For a time, ethanol plants will buy 
corn so long as they cover all their 
operating costs. In the longer run, 
though, they must also cover their 
capital costs. Ethanol plants sell 
ethanol and distillers grains and 
buy corn, natural gas, electricity, 
and labor. Given representative 
operating cost estimates and the 
relationship between the price of 
distillers grains and the price of 
corn, it is straightforward to calcu-
late the price of corn that just cov-
ers operating costs. Table 1 shows 
the maximum price of corn that an 
effi cient ethanol producer can pay 
at various ethanol prices. As shown, 
a 50¢ change in the price of ethanol 
changes the operator’s ability to 
pay for corn by $1.93 per bushel. 
In the corn marketing year that 
just ended on August 31, domestic 
livestock feeders, food users, and 
importers used about 10 billion 
bushels of corn. Corn production 
was about 13 billion bushels. Etha-
nol producers used the difference, 
about 3 billion bushels. If non-etha-
nol users last year had high maxi-
mum prices for corn, then the etha-
nol industry was the marginal user 
of corn. If ethanol was the marginal 
user, then the market price of corn 
should be determined by ethanol 
producers’ ability to pay for corn. 
Figure 1 shows the ethanol in-
dustry’s break-even corn prices and 
actual market prices since March 
of 2005. Note that before the fall of 
2006, there is no evidence that the 
ethanol industry was the marginal 
user of corn. The reason is that corn 
supplies were more than adequate 
to supply the industry. During this 
period, the export market was 
likely the marginal user of corn. The 
Table 1. Break-even prices of corn
Figure 1. Break-even and actual corn prices
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large gap between the break-even 
corn prices and actual corn prices 
explains why it was so profi table to 
produce ethanol during this time.
More recently, there is a much 
closer relationship between the abil-
ity to pay for corn to produce etha-
nol and the price of corn. Since the 
fall of 2007, it is clear that the etha-
nol industry has been the marginal 
user of corn. Variations in the break-
even price of corn explain about 85 
percent of the variation in the price 
of corn over the last year. The re-
maining variation is largely account-
ed for by uncertainty about the size 
of the 2008 crop. Note also that the 
difference between the break-even 
corn price and the actual corn price 
has been narrowing over time. This 
narrowing illustrates the very tight 
margins that currently exist in the 
ethanol industry. 
The marginal user of corn for 
the remainder of the current mar-
keting year (ending July 31, 2009) 
will either be the ethanol industry 
or speculators who will buy corn 
and store it until the following year 
if corn prices get too low. If the etha-
nol industry is the marginal user 
then to predict the market price of 
corn, all we need to do is predict the 
break-even price of corn in the etha-
nol industry. 
Predicting the Ethanol Industry’s 
Ability to Pay for Corn
The key factor that determines the 
ethanol industry’s ability to pay for 
corn is the price of ethanol. Because 
ethanol is a substitute for gasoline 
and because the price of gasoline 
closely follows the price of crude 
oil, it seems logical that knowing the 
price of crude oil alone should al-
low us to predict the price of etha-
nol. But the relationship between 
crude oil and ethanol prices is not 
that straightforward. As shown in 
Figure 2, the variable relationship 
between gasoline and ethanol prices 
complicates matters. Before April 
of 2007, ethanol prices were higher 
than gasoline prices. Since April 
Figure 2. Relationship between gasoline and ethanol prices
of 2008, ethanol prices have been 
much lower than gasoline prices. 
One explanation for this change is 
that the rapid expansion in ethanol 
production has forced ethanol to 
compete directly with gasoline as 
a substitute fuel, and the price of 
ethanol has been forced down to 
create an incentive for blenders in 
the Southeast to expand their blend-
ing infrastructure. 
An equation that has been used 
to predict prices sets the price of 
ethanol at 68 percent of the price of 
gasoline (to account for ethanol’s 
lower energy value) plus the blend-
ers tax credit (to account for the per 
gallon benefi t of the ethanol subsi-
dy). But this equation has over-pre-
dicted the price of ethanol by about 
8 percent since June of 2008. 
If ethanol continues to be 
priced 8 percent below its energy 
value, then if we know the whole-
sale price of gasoline, we can 
predict the price of corn. Table 2 
provides these estimates for crude 
oil prices between $50 and $120 per 
barrel, accounting for the recent 
wedge between calculated break-
even corn prices and actual corn 
prices shown in Figure 1. If crude 
oil prices stabilize at $80 per bar-
rel, the price of corn will stabilize 
at approximately $3.77 per bushel. 
As shown, if crude oil climbs once 
again to $120 per barrel, then we 
should see corn prices climb again 
to the $6.00-per-bushel mark.
The estimates in Table 2 should 
be alarming to corn farmers: if 
crude oil falls to $50 per barrel, 
then the ability to pay for corn by 
the ethanol industry will fall back 
to around $2.15 per bushel. Because 
this price is much lower than cur-
rent production costs, crop farmers 
would face severe fi nancial stress. 
But we should never see corn prices 
Table 2. Predictions of corn prices 
for alternative crude oil prices
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U.S. consumers are on track to consume 138 billion gal-lons of gasoline in 2008 
(down from 142 billion gallons in 
2007) and approximately 9 billion 
gallons of U.S.-produced ethanol 
plus perhaps another 800 million 
gallons of imported ethanol. Fuel 
blenders have a strong incentive 
to use all this ethanol because 
they receive a 51¢-per-gallon 
subsidy (the blenders tax credit) 
from taxpayers. In addition, since 
February of this year, the price 
of ethanol has been less than the 
price of gasoline. U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) 
regulations allow blended fuel to 
contain up to 10 percent ethanol. 
California regulations allow up to 
5.7 percent blends.
Benefi t of Blending
The net benefit of replacing a gal-
lon of gasoline with a gallon of eth-
anol depends on whether gasoline 
blenders perceive that ethanol is a 
perfect substitute for gasoline on 
a volume basis or an energy basis. 
At a 10 percent blend, it is doubt-
ful whether most consumers per-
ceive a change in gas mileage, so it 
is likely that gasoline blenders val-
ue ethanol on a par with gasoline 
on a volume basis. Figure 1 shows 
the per gallon net benefit from us-
ing a gallon of ethanol instead of a 
gallon of gasoline. This net benefit 
equals the price of ethanol (as re-
ported by the USDA’s Agricultural 
Marketing Service for Iowa) minus 
the wholesale price of gasoline (as 
reported by the New York Mercan-
tile Exchange for reformulated gas-
Who’s Using All the Ethanol?
oline) plus the blenders tax credit. 
Multiplying the daily benefit by 
the daily quantity of ethanol used 
results in an aggregate benefit to 
gasoline blenders of approximately 
$7.4 billion from February 2007 to 
October 2008. To the extent that 
gasoline producers are also blend-
ers, this benefit works to offset 
their losses caused by the nega-
tive impacts of expanded ethanol 
production on gasoline prices. 
Given the large incentive to 
use ethanol, it is no surprise that 
a growing proportion of gasoline 
contains ethanol. The U.S. De-
partment of Energy reports the 
proportion of both reformulated 
gasoline and conventional gasoline 
that contains ethanol. Reformu-
lated gasoline is sold in regions of 
the country that are required to 
use it under the Clean Air Act. As 
shown in Figure 2, the phase-out 
of the additive MTBE in the spring 
of 2006 resulted in ethanol being 
used in practically all reformulated 
gasoline. Plentiful ethanol supplies 
and a large incentive to substitute 
ethanol for gasoline greatly in-
creased the proportion of conven-
tional gasoline that contains some 
ethanol from less than 20 percent 
in the fall of 2006 to more than 
50 percent today. Currently, more 
than 70 percent of U.S. gasoline 
contains ethanol. 
The Blend Wall 
The Renewable Fuels Standard 
(RFS) mandates use of 15 billion 
gallons of ethanol by 2015. Given 
that fl ex-fuel vehicles are primar-
ily driven in regions where E85 is 
not available, almost all of this 15 
billion gallons will be consumed as 
a 10 percent blend unless the EPA 
decides to allow higher blends. At 
a 10 percent blend, 15 billion gal-
lons of ethanol would be blended 
with 135 billion gallons of gasoline. 
Unless total motor fuel consump-
Figure 1. Per gallon benefit to blenders of replacing gasoline with 
ethanol
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tion grows substantially in the next 
few years, nearly every gallon of 
gasoline will need to be blended 
at a 10 percent blend to meet the 
RFS. But it would be quite costly to 
blend every U.S. gallon of gasoline 
with ethanol. Ethanol is already be-
ing shipped to all the low-cost and 
most of the medium-cost blending 
locations. Continued large price 
discounts will be needed to attract 
investment in blending capabil-
ity and ethanol transport to the 
remaining locations. Furthermore, 
a portion of the U.S. population ap-
parently does not want to use etha-
nol blends in vehicles. Convincing 
these people would require hefty 
price discounts. It seems inevitable 
that the United States will hit an 
economic “blend wall” before the 
15-billion-gallon mandate is met.
If this blend wall is reached 
when 85 percent of the U.S. gasoline 
supply is blended with 10 percent 
ethanol, and total fuel consumption 
stays at 150 billion gallons, then 
about 115 billion gallons of gasoline 
will be blended with 10 percent etha-
nol. This would account for a bit less 
than 13 billion gallons of ethanol, 
leaving 2 billion gallons of ethanol 
without a ready market. Forcing 
this ethanol into the remaining 15 
percent of U.S. gasoline would se-
verely drive down ethanol prices. 
Exporting the ethanol would be 
diffi cult because the United States 
would be vulnerable to charges 
that it was dumping subsidized 
ethanol on export markets. 
Is the Solution E12?
There is a contradiction between 
the RFS mandates, EPA blending 
regulations, and the interests of 
U.S. ethanol producers. This con-
tradiction is even more evident 
once we consider the need to fi nd 
a market for the additional 20 bil-
lion gallons of advanced biofuels 
mandated by the RFS. One short-
term solution would be for EPA to 
simply fi nd that E12 (12 percent 
ethanol blend) is a substantially 
similar motor fuel to E10. Then 
15.5 billion gallons of ethanol 
could be blended into the 115 bil-
lion gallons of gasoline without 
causing the price of ethanol to be 
driven down even more. But this 
does nothing to make room for the 
advanced biofuels that may soon 
be hitting the market. ◆
Michael Boland is a professor of eco-
nomics and associate director of the 
Arthur Capper Cooperative Center at 
Kansas State University. 
Figure 2. Share of U.S. gasoline containing ethanol
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Volumetric excise tax cred-its—more commonly known as blenders tax credits—have 
been in place since 1978 for ethanol 
and since 2004 for biodiesel. The 
ethanol subsidy will fall from its 
current level of 51¢ per gallon today 
to 45¢ per gallon on January 1. The 
biodiesel subsidy is $1.00 per gal-
lon (50¢ per gallon for previously 
used oils or grease). The subsidy 
is paid on every gallon of ethanol 
or biodiesel that is blended in the 
United States with any quantity of 
fossil fuel. All biofuels blended with 
fossil fuels are eligible for the sub-
sidy regardless of where the bio-
fuels were produced or where the 
blend is consumed. The blenders 
tax credit reduces the tax liability 
of blenders, so it is equivalent to 
the U.S. Treasury writing a check 
to blenders for each gallon of bio-
fuels they use. The purpose of the 
subsidy is to increase the willing-
ness of blenders to buy U.S.-pro-
duced biofuels and to increase the 
domestic price of biofuels. It has 
undoubtedly met these objectives 
for U.S.-produced corn ethanol. But 
opponents of the biodiesel blenders 
credit argue that its main effect is 
to subsidize biodiesel produced in 
Southeast Asia, South America, and 
Europe that is destined for Euro-
pean consumption.
Incentives to Splash and Dash
European biodiesel producers were 
the fi rst to protest against the sharp 
increase in biodiesel imports com-
ing from the Unites States beginning 
in 2007. The Europeans argue that 
the only reason U.S. exports have 
increased is a misuse of the blend-
ers tax credit through a mechanism 
called “splash and dash.” The prac-
tice consists of blending (“splash-
ing”) 0.1 percent of U.S. diesel 
fuel with 99.9 percent of imported 
biodiesel and then shipping (“dash-
ing”) the resulting blend to the Euro-
pean Union. 
The payoff to splash and dash is 
large. Consider a 2.5 million gallon 
shipment of Malaysian biodiesel des-
tined for Europe. At a biodiesel price 
of $4.00 per gallon, this shipment is 
worth $10 million. If the tanker makes 
a port stop in the United States and 
adds 25,000 gallons of diesel to its 
load, the company will collect a $2.5 
million tax credit, thereby increasing 
the value of its cargo by 25 percent. 
This additional payment potentially 
allows imported biodiesel to com-
pete successfully with E.U.-produced 
biodiesel. The incentive to re-export 
imported biodiesel is so high that 
tankers of biodiesel produced in 
Europe were shipped to the United 
States this summer to receive the 
$1.00-per-gallon subsidy.
Instead of U.S. taxpayers tak-
ing the lead in stopping this misuse 
of a domestic biofuels program, it 
is the European biodiesel industry 
that has argued most strenuously 
against what it calls an unfair 
trade practice. The Europeans 
claim the mechanism is damag-
ing local producers, constitutes 
export dumping, and that the 
program violates World Trade 
Organization agreements. The Eu-
ropean Biodiesel Board presented 
a formal complaint before the Eu-
ropean Commission, which found 
suffi cient evidence to launch an 
investigation. The investigation 
will determine whether placing 
tariffs (either countervailing or 
antidumping) on U.S. biodiesel is 
warranted. On the U.S. side, there 
is growing opposition as the cost 
to taxpayers increases to the mil-
lions of dollars. Legislation that 
would prevent imported biodiesel 
that is subsequently exported 
from collecting the subsidy passed 
the House of Representatives 
and Senate and has been sent to 
a conference committee. The bill 
(H.R. 6049) has the support of the 
National Biodiesel Board. But crit-
ics (including European produc-
ers) contend that it does not go 
far enough in solving the problem, 
because U.S.-produced biodiesel 
could still receive the subsidies 
before being shipped overseas.
For the E.U. claims of subsidy-
driven triangulation and increased 
exports to be plausible, we should 
expect to see simultaneous in-
creases in levels of both imports 
and exports of biodiesel in the 
United States. Notice, however, 
that this does not necessarily 
provide irrefutable evidence that 
biodiesel is being routed through 
the United States with the sole pur-
pose of collecting subsidies. The 
trade statistics can also be used to 
provide a rough estimate of how 
much U.S. taxpayers are spending 
to subsidize fuels to be consumed 
abroad. The distribution of the 
benefi ts across regions can also be 
approximated. 
Instead of U.S. taxpayers 
taking the lead in stopping 
this misuse of a domestic 
biofuels program, it is the 
European biodiesel 
industry that has argued 
most strenuously against 
what it calls an unfair 
trade practice. 
FALL 2008            CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      7 
Iowa Ag Review
Continued on page 11
Estimation of Taxpayer Losses 
Obtaining accurate fi gures of interna-
tional trade of biodiesel is not easy 
because biodiesel trade data is com-
bined with data on other goods in 
trade records. However, reasonable 
approximations can be made.
Source: Constructed by the authors using USDA-FAS data.
Figure 1. United States imports (a) and exports (b) of biodiesel by main 
destination for the 2006–2008 (January–August) period
Table 1. Supply and utilization of biodiesel for the 2006–2008 period
Source: Constructed by the authors based on USDA-FAS and U.S. Census Bureau data.
aCalculated as a residual assuming stock levels are zero.
U.S. biodiesel trade has in-
creased sharply since 2005. While 
imports increased by over 210 per-
cent between 2006 and 2007, exports 
increased by a staggering 684 per-
cent in the same period (Figure 1). 
The fi gure also shows that trade will 
likely experience another signifi cant 
jump in 2008 since both imports and 
exports largely exceeded the 2007 
fi gures in the fi rst eight months of 
the year alone. The European Union 
is the destination of a vast majority 
of biodiesel exports. Imports from 
Southeast Asia surged during 2006 
and 2007. South America is currently 
challenging that dominance, mainly 
because of the rapid growth of the 
Argentinean industry.
Further insight into the des-
tination of biodiesel produced or 
imported into the United States can 
be gained by incorporating informa-
tion on domestic production and 
consumption (Table 1). Clearly, 
domestic production experienced a 
strong increase between 2006 and 
2007 and is poised for continued 
growth during 2008. However, con-
sumption fi gures point to a different 
story, whereby declines seem likely 
this year, indicating that U.S. produc-
ers are favoring the European Union 
over domestic destinations for their 
product. Interestingly, exports have 
exceeded production levels during 
the fi rst eight months of 2008, hint-
ing that at least some of the exports 
originated abroad.
It is reasonable to assume that 
all biodiesel produced in the United 
States or imported will claim the 
blenders credit. In this case, the 
biodiesel tax credit has cost tax-
payers about $1.28 billion between 
January of 2007 and August of 2008. 
About $360 million of this amount 
was awarded to foreign-produced 
biodiesel. 
On the demand side, $504 mil-
lion was used to subsidize biodie-
sel consumed in the United States 
whereas $782 million was used 
to subsidize biodiesel consumed 
by the European Union. The im-
plications of closing the splash-
and-dash loophole are diffi cult to 
ascertain, as this will affect the 
dynamics of both domestic pro-
duction and international trade. 
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Each spring and summer in the Gulf of Mexico, nutrient-rich ef-fl uent from the Mississippi and 
Atchafalaya Rivers stimulates algae 
growth. The rates of growth are 
typically so high that when the algae 
die and decompose, they consume 
more dissolved oxygen than can be 
replenished by the ocean. The Gulf 
hypoxic zone or “dead zone” is cre-
ated when dissolved oxygen levels 
become too low to support sea life. 
The extent of the 2008 hypoxic zone 
is shown in the chart below.
In a recent article in Science, 
Robert Diaz and Rutger Rosen-
berg report that the Gulf of Mexico 
is just one of 405 hypoxic zones 
identifi ed around the world. In the 
1980s, Diaz counted only 162 such 
zones. The hypoxic zone that has 
received the most attention in the 
United States is in the Chesapeake 
Bay, where hypoxia was fi rst identi-
fi ed in the 1930s. 
Costs and Benefi ts of Fixing Gulf Hypoxia 
The increase in the number of 
hypoxic zones around the world is 
a result of increased nitrogen and 
phosphorus fi nding its way into riv-
ers and, eventually, oceans. Excess 
nutrients come primarily from loss of 
applied nitrogen and phosphorus on 
farm fi elds, golf courses and lawns, 
and nutrient discharges from sewage 
treatment plants. A 1999 study by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration concluded that only 
10 percent of the nutrients that 
contribute to Gulf hypoxia can be 
traced to point sources such as sew-
age treatment plants and industry 
discharge sites. An updated analysis 
performed in 2006 and included in a 
scientifi c reassessment undertaken 
by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s Science Advisory 
Board (Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of 
Mexico: An Update, 2007) implicates 
point sources for about 14 percent 
of the nitrogen loads and 27 percent 
of the phosphorous. Even with these 
updated estimates, nonpoint sources 
contribute the lion’s share of nutri-
ents, and agriculture is the largest 
contributor of non-point losses. 
Nutrient losses from agriculture 
occur in a variety of ways. Heavy 
rainfall events leach soil nitrogen 
into tile lines that discharge into 
ditches and streams. Eroded soil 
that is rich in phosphorus fi nds 
its way into rivers and streams. 
Rainfall can wash surface-applied 
manure off farm fi elds. The evi-
dence is overwhelming that exten-
sive Gulf hypoxia would not occur 
if all farm-applied nutrients stayed 
on the farm and were used by crops 
or were stored in wetlands or other 
natural sinks. 
Cost-Benefi t Analysis for 
Environmental Challenges
Weighing the benefi ts against the 
costs of alternative decisions is a 
common-sense guide that helps us 
run our everyday lives in an effi -
cient manner and provides us with 
goods and services at the lowest 
cost. Making decisions without this 
kind of analysis would waste time, 
money, effort, and natural resourc-
es. This logic has led governments 
to use cost-benefi t analysis to de-
termine whether actions to correct 
environmental problems should be 
taken. After all, it would be foolish 
to correct a diffi cult-to-fi x environ-
mental problem if the benefi ts of 
fi xing it were small. Targeting scarce 
resources to those problems in 
Bottom dissolved oxygen (mg/L), July 1-27, 2008
Sources: N. Rabalais, Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium. Map by B. Babin.
Notes: Map of bottom water oxygen levels in mg/l (or ppm). The dark blue area outlined in black shows where readings are less than 2, where 
hypoxia exists. 
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which benefi ts exceed costs by the 
greatest amount yields the greatest 
good per unit of effort expended. 
But a number of unique diffi culties 
arise in using cost-benefi t analysis 
to solve environmental problems.
The fi rst diffi culty arises be-
cause unlike private decisions in 
which costs and benefi ts are both 
borne by the private decision maker, 
environmental problems are typi-
cally caused by people who do not 
experience the outcome of their 
actions. Upstream polluters receive 
the benefi ts of low-cost waste dis-
posal, but downstream users suffer 
the consequences. In the absence of 
legal obligations, the costs of getting 
upstream polluters to take actions to 
reduce their pollution should also be 
considered in addition to the ben-
efi ts of water quality improvements 
to downstream users when compar-
ing the costs and benefi ts. A political 
problem often arises after a decision 
is made to take corrective action, 
because the party asked to pay the 
costs of cleanup will naturally try to 
get some other party to pay. 
Perhaps the greatest diffi culty 
arises because of the complexity of 
accurately measuring benefi ts of ac-
tions to improve environmental qual-
ity. Unlike most privately purchased 
goods and services, environmental 
goods (such as clean air, clean water, 
and pleasing landscapes) typically 
do not have an observable market 
price associated with them that can 
be used to determine their value. If 
an environmental improvement re-
sults in an increase in the production 
of a traded good, then the increase 
in production is one measure of the 
benefi ts. For improvements in other 
goods, economists have learned how 
to estimate benefi ts of, say, clean wa-
ter in lakes, by observing how much 
extra people are willing to pay to 
travel to lakes with clean water rela-
tive to similar lakes with degraded 
water. Similarly, differences in real 
estate values can often be used to 
reveal how much people value clean 
air or vistas. But these approaches 
can be limited because the benefi ts 
of environmental improvements 
are not limited to just those who 
actually use them for production or 
recreation.  
Many people who have never 
traveled to the Everglades still would 
not want to see this natural area 
destroyed. Maintaining the Ever-
glades has value to some people 
either because they want to have the 
option of visiting there in the future 
or just because the knowledge that 
this natural area exists generates 
value. Estimation of these types of 
values is quite diffi cult and prone to 
large uncertainties, but this does not 
mean that those values are neces-
sarily small and should not be con-
sidered in a cost-benefi t comparison.
A review of the benefi ts and 
costs of eliminating the hypoxic 
zone in the Gulf of Mexico shows 
why, in the absence of strong regula-
tory requirements, we should ex-
pect little action to be taken quickly.
Benefi ts of Eliminating 
Gulf Hypoxia
While there is abundant evidence 
that the size and duration of the Gulf 
of Mexico hypoxic zone is large and 
caused by human actions, research 
to clearly identify the impacts on the 
ecosystem of the Gulf, including the 
effects on the size and diversity of 
fi sh stocks and the ability of the sys-
tem to rebound after a long hypoxic 
event, is still incomplete. Further-
more, understanding thoroughly the 
benefi ts of reducing the dead zone 
to the goal articulated by the EPA 
requires knowledge about
• the resulting changes in rec-
reational opportunities and 
commercial fi shing that come 
about from these changes in 
fi sh stocks; and 
• how important the preserva-
tion of this ecosystem is to 
current and future residents of 
the region and the rest of the 
country. 
What evidence is available? 
A number of recent studies have 
established links between hypoxic 
conditions and declines in habitat 
quality that likely affect the diver-
sity and quantity of life. From a com-
mercial fi shing perspective, declines 
in Brown shrimp populations and 
catches appear to be directly linked 
to hypoxic events, with estimates in 
one study of a loss of up to 25 per-
cent of shrimp habitat on the Louisi-
ana shelf. The commercial fi shing in-
dustry in the Gulf is one of the most 
valuable fi sheries in the country, 
with an annual value of over $650 
million, and Brown Shrimp is one 
of the most valuable of those fi sh 
stocks. Further, changes in catch 
rates or population levels of a single 
species can mask effects on the 
entire food chain that may not be as 
easily measured as those directly 
related to commercially caught fi sh.
Of even more concern to some 
scientists is evidence that points 
to a “regime” shift in the Gulf. This 
refers to situations in which the 
entire structure and functioning of 
an ecosystem changes because of 
some rapid external infl uence. In the 
case of Gulf hypoxia, scientists are 
concerned that a regime shift would 
;
Of even more concern 
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evidence that points 
to a “regime” shift in 
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to situations in which 
the entire structure 
and functioning of an 
ecosystem changes 
because of some rapid 
external infl uence.
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mean that even larger and longer-
term reductions in nutrients would 
need to be made in order to restore 
the Gulf to its original functioning. 
Concerns about the effects of the 
dead zone on the living resources 
of the Gulf are all well and good, but 
might there be any benefi ts closer to 
home from undertaking actions that 
would improve the conditions in the 
Gulf? Interestingly, here the evidence 
is perhaps more compelling that 
changes would be benefi cial. Lakes 
and streams in Iowa are among the 
most impaired in the country, and 
there is signifi cant pressure from the 
EPA and environmental groups to 
improve this situation. A number of 
the agricultural practices that could 
help address Gulf hypoxia would 
contribute directly to improvements 
in local water quality. Other local 
benefi ts would also accrue from 
changes in agricultural landscapes. 
For example, a major investment in 
strategically placed wetlands and 
buffers would likely reduce the risk 
of fl ood damage and provide habitat 
to a number of species that hunters 
and recreationists enjoy. 
Costs of Eliminating Gulf Hypoxia
Because agriculture is the primary 
source of nutrients that cause Gulf 
hypoxia, those involved in agricul-
ture would need to take action in any 
clean-up program. The main sources 
of lost nutrients are nitrogen losses 
from leaching and run-off, phos-
phorus in eroded soil, and animal 
manure runoff. Focus on control of 
nutrients in the Upper Midwest is 
warranted because most of the crop-
land that contributes to Gulf hypoxia 
is located in this region.
Controlling nutrient losses from 
animal manure is straightforward. 
Manure that is applied to farm fi elds 
at agronomic rates, at times when it 
can be incorporated into the soil and 
not be subjected to heavy rain events, 
will not lose nutrients. Manure storage 
must be of adequate capacity to hold 
all generated manure until it can be 
safely applied. However, many live-
stock producers do not have adequate 
manure storage facilities or ready 
access to farm fi elds that grow crops 
that can use the nutrients. Produc-
ers in nutrient-surplus regions have 
particular diffi culty fi nding adequate 
crop acreage. The costs of controlling 
nutrient runoff in these regions would 
be large, involving installation of meth-
ane digesters or moving livestock to 
nutrient-defi cit regions. High fertilizer 
prices provide a good incentive to 
livestock and crop producers in nutri-
ent-defi cit regions (all of the Corn Belt) 
to invest in adequate storage facilities 
and application equipment to fully uti-
lize manure nutrients. 
There are many well-known 
ways to reduce soil erosion. Instal-
lation of grass waterways, terraces, 
and adoption of conservation tillage 
can all greatly reduce soil erosion 
rates. Because a relatively small 
share of crop land is subject to high 
rates of soil erosion, the costs of 
reducing soil loss vary dramatically 
across cropland.
Nitrogen loss from cropland is 
the most diffi cult to control because 
nitrogen-laden soils in the Upper 
Midwest are needed for high yields, 
but nitrogen-laden soils are also 
susceptible to large losses from 
unexpected rainfall events. One key 
to controlling losses is to reduce 
the time between nitrogen fertilizer 
applications and rapid plant uptake. 
Rapid uptake of nitrogen by corn 
does not occur in most of the Corn 
Belt until the last two weeks of June. 
Nitrogen that is applied at or just 
before corn planting in the fi rst part 
of May will be subject to losses for 
four of fi ve weeks. Nitrogen that is 
applied in the early spring or in the 
fall is subject to losses for at least an 
additional six weeks. Applying nitro-
gen in a side-dressed fashion in the 
middle of June would reduce losses 
substantially. However, application 
costs would increase, as would the 
risk of yield losses from poor tim-
ing of applications. An alternative 
to controlling soil losses in tiled 
fi elds is to route drainage water into 
constructed wetlands that have the 
ability to capture and utilize excess 
nitrogen, thereby cleaning the water 
before it travels into streams.
What Should We Do?
Defi nitive research that demon-
strates either that the benefi ts of 
reducing Gulf hypoxia exceed the 
costs or that the costs exceed the 
benefi ts simply does not exist. And 
while economists have made great 
strides in their ability to estimate 
benefi ts and costs, such defi nitive re-
search for a problem as complex as 
Gulf hypoxia may not be forthcom-
ing. Furthermore, recent high prices 
for agricultural commodities signal 
farmers that more fertilizer needs 
to be applied to crop land, not less. 
Both the uncertainty about costs 
and benefi ts and the current need 
to maintain high production levels 
gives advocates of the status quo 
the upper hand in the Gulf hypoxia 
debate. 
But the evidence seems quite 
strong that our inability to keep 
fertilizer nutrients on the farm is 
doing signifi cant damage to many 
coastal waters. Over time, as food 
shortages recede, we may decide to 
move to a common-sense approach 
to managing farmland and livestock 
production. By locating livestock in 
nutrient-defi cient crop locations, by 
controlling soil erosion to maintain 
long-term soil health, and by reduc-
ing soil nitrogen losses or by treating 
nitrogen-rich runoff before it enters 
streams and rivers, we should be 
able to achieve both healthy coastal 
waters and profi table farms. 
For More Information
To learn more, go to http://www.
epa.gov/msbasin.◆
Catherine Kling is a professor of eco-
nomics and head of Resource and Envi-
ronmental Policy at CARD. 
FALL 2008            CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      11 
Iowa Ag Review
How Low Will Corn Prices Go?
Continued from page 3
drop this much, even if crude oil 
does drop to $50 per barrel. The 
reason is that at such a low corn 
price, speculators would likely move 
into the market to buy corn for deliv-
ery in the 2009 marketing year.  Fur-
thermore, at $2.15 per bushel corn 
farmers would not plant enough 
corn in 2009 to meet the almost 13-
billion-bushel demand. 
Backstopping Prices with 
Ethanol Mandates
Under the new Renewable Fuels 
Standard, U.S. gasoline blenders 
must blend 10.5 billion gallons of 
ethanol in the 2009 calendar year. In 
2010, this mandate increases to 12 
billion gallons. This means that 11.5 
billion gallons must be produced 
from 2009 corn supplies. With crude 
oil at $50 per barrel, it is doubtful 
that Brazil will export large amounts 
of ethanol to the United States be-
cause of the import tariff, so the 
U.S. ethanol industry will need to 
produce much of this amount. An 
ethanol level of 11.5 billion gallons 
requires 4.2 billion bushels of corn. 
With at least 8.7 billion bushels of 
non-fuel demand for corn, 12.9 bil-
lion bushels of corn will be needed 
in 2009. At a trend yield of 154 
bushels per acre, this will require 
83 million harvested acres or about 
90 million planted acres. Simply put, 
U.S. farmers will not plant 90 million 
acres of corn if the price of corn is 
$2.15 per bushel because this corn 
price would not cover the additional 
production costs of planting corn af-
ter corn. Given recent experience, it 
will likely take a price of more than 
$3.50 or $4.00 per bushel to induce 
farmers to plant the required acres. 
At $2.00 corn, the United States 
would be lucky to see 75 million 
acres planted.
So what is the outlook for corn 
prices? If crude oil prices rise, so 
too will corn prices. If crude oil pric-
es fall, corn prices will fall through 
the remainder of the 2008 market-
ing year, but only to a point. They 
cannot fall too far because specula-
tors would move into the market.  
Recall that 2009 prices must be high 
enough to induce farmers to plant 
enough acres in 2009 to meet etha-
nol mandates. Thus, there is a limit 
to how far 2008 prices can go before 
corn buyers will begin to buy 2008 
corn for delivery at the 2009 prices. 
At this point, 2008 prices will not fall 
any further.
The bottom line is that ethanol 
mandates place an effective fl oor un-
der corn (and soybean) prices. This 
fl oor price is particularly relevant 
for new-crop futures prices before 
the 2009 crop is planted because of 
the need to buy corn acres to meet 
ethanol mandates. Post-planting 
prices will refl ect crude oil prices 
and expectations about corn yields. 
Farmers looking to 2009 should look 
at their own costs and returns to 
fi gure out how high corn prices will 
need to be to ensure that 90 million 
acres of corn are planted in 2009. ◆
Splashing and Dashing Biodiesel
Continued from page 7
Additionally, the decision about 
whether or not to restrict the sub-
sidy to only biodiesel consumed in 
the United States will have a large 
impact on the biodiesel industry 
because the export market is tak-
ing an increasingly large propor-
tion of production.  
Sorting Policy Impacts
Available data indicate that a 
large proportion of the biodiesel 
imported into the United States is 
later re-exported to the European 
Union. The E.U. market is also the 
main outlet for much of the biodie-
sel produced in the United States. 
Together, these export volumes 
explain why E.U. producers have 
been so opposed to U.S. biodiesel 
subsidies. While E.U. producers have 
sound reasons to protest, U.S. tax-
payers should also know that they 
are subsidizing biofuels that allow 
the European Union to meet its bio-
fuels targets at a lower cost. When 
evaluating alternative policy options 
for addressing the splash-and-dash 
controversy, an essential question to 
ask is, Do the benefi ts to U.S. taxpay-
ers from a domestic biodiesel indus-
try outweigh the costs of subsidizing 
biodiesel produced or consumed in 
other countries?  
For More Information
See the article by Erin Voegele, 
“EU Launches Investigation of U.S. 
Biodiesel Industry,” Biodiesel Maga-
zine, July 2008. ◆
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